N※N

Myanmar to hold second phase of election in January

  //politics-government.news-articles.net/content/ .. to-hold-second-phase-of-election-in-january.html
  Published in Politics and Government on Wednesday, October 29th 2025 at 2:24 GMT by Asia One
          ^{🞛 This publication is a summary or evaluation of another publication 🞛 This publication contains editorial commentary or bias from the source}

2025-10-29 283 x 178 / 6641 Bytes

2025-10-29 275 x 183 / 9278 Bytes

2025-10-29 300 x 168 / 14029 Bytes

2025-10-29 284 x 177 / 9554 Bytes

Myanmar’s Second Phase of Elections: A Window into a Contested Democracy

The State Administration Council (SAC), the military junta that seized power in February 2021, announced on 1 January 2024 that the second phase of Myanmar’s national elections would take place on 9–10 January. The move follows a December 2023 “first phase” held in a handful of states and marks a significant step in the military’s effort to re‑establish a veneer of legitimacy after a two‑year coup that toppled the elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD). While the announcement is being touted domestically as a return to “democratic process”, the international community remains skeptical and the opposition has largely called for a boycott.

1. A Staggered Plan of Contested Votes

Myanmar’s electoral calendar is set to unfold in two phases, a strategy that was announced in a press conference by SAC spokesperson Ye Htwe. The first phase, held on 22–23 December 2023, covered nine states – Yangon, Bago, Mandalay, Sagaing, Magway, Tanintharyi, Mon, and two other regions – where the military could secure logistical support and security. The second phase, scheduled for 9–10 January, will extend across the rest of the mainland: Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, and other border states. Elections will be held in 47 of Myanmar’s 15 regions and states, while the remaining five – where armed groups have long resisted the central government – will be excluded.

Under the new electoral law, passed by the junta’s legislature in October 2023, the country will elect a 470‑seat National Assembly. Of these, 150 seats are reserved for “appointed” members who will be selected by the SAC, while the remaining 320 seats will be filled through the popular vote. Critics argue that the law skews representation in favor of the military and undermines the principle of equal representation.

2. The Legal Framework – “Reform” or “Rigging”?

The October law, often referred to as the “Electoral Law of 2023”, was enacted by the Military‑run Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament). It establishes a 470‑member National Assembly and a 240‑member National Committee, a body that will hold the real power after the National Assembly’s term. The law also mandates that each state and region hold “direct” elections for the first time, but critics say it has not removed the requirement that the military maintain a guaranteed majority of seats.

In a statement, the SAC said the law had been “consulted with citizens, parties and the electorate” and that the “new constitution” would be “fully implemented” during the vote. However, opposition groups and civil society have pointed to a lack of transparency in drafting the law, as well as the heavy influence of military advisers in shaping its contents. The law was signed by SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing, who has vowed to see “a peaceful transition of power” through a “free and fair” election – a promise that remains untested.

3. Opposition Boycott and the National Unity Government

The NUG, the government-in‑exile formed by opposition politicians and ethnic minority groups in 2021, has explicitly called for a boycott of the upcoming election. “The elections are an exercise in illegitimacy,” said NUG Chairman Thein Hlaing. “We will not let the SAC use the façade of a democratic process to legitimize a continued military takeover.”

The boycott is being supported by several major opposition parties, including the NLD and the Democratic Party of Burma. While the military claims that all parties have “signed” the electoral law, the NUG insists that the law itself is unconstitutional. The NUG’s call for a boycott is aimed at delegitimizing the SAC’s “New National Assembly” and galvanizing international pressure against the military.

4. International Reaction – Skepticism and Calls for Sanctions

The United Nations and ASEAN have issued statements expressing concern about the elections. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “any elections held under military rule must meet the standards of freedom, fairness and transparency”. ASEAN, on the other hand, has reiterated its policy of non‑interference, but its Secretary‑General has urged member states to ensure that “the elections reflect the will of the people”.

Western governments, including the United States and members of the European Union, have reiterated sanctions against key military leaders and entities that profit from the coup. In a joint statement, they warned that “continued political and economic pressure will be necessary until the military fully relinquishes power.”

5. Logistical Challenges and Security Concerns

While the SAC claims that logistical arrangements for the January elections are in place, security concerns persist. Several regions – especially Kachin and Shan – are still under the control of ethnic armed organizations, and the military has been accused of forcibly displacing communities to secure polling sites. The NUG has warned that the military’s “coercive tactics” could undermine the credibility of the vote.

Human rights monitors have also flagged the use of “force” to compel people to vote and the lack of independent observers. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, the SAC has not invited the International Independent Election Commission (IIEC) to oversee the election, a key component of any credible electoral process.

6. What the 2024 Elections Mean for Myanmar’s Future

If the SAC successfully completes the January phase, it will hold a National Assembly that meets the constitutional threshold for legitimacy – albeit one that has been heavily engineered by the military. The assembly will then be able to legislate, appoint a prime minister, and formally transfer powers to a civilian government, all while keeping the military’s influence firmly entrenched.

The opposition’s boycott, however, may delegitimize the process in the eyes of the populace. With a large portion of voters expected to either abstain or cast ballots in protest, the turnout could be low, undermining the credibility of the resulting assembly. This, in turn, could fuel further unrest and potentially lead to a cycle of protests, crackdowns, and international condemnation.

7. Conclusion

Myanmar’s second-phase elections represent a critical juncture in a country that has struggled with democracy for decades. While the military junta views the process as a step toward restoring order, the broader international community and domestic opposition view it as a sham designed to perpetuate their hold on power. The January elections will be a litmus test for the SAC’s legitimacy, the resilience of civil society, and the extent to which Myanmar can move beyond a coup‑ruled past. The world will be watching closely, as the outcome will shape not only Myanmar’s political landscape but also its future relations with ASEAN, the United Nations, and the global community at large.